The Ethical Dimension ofMitigating and Adapting to Climate Change or Sprinkling Some Fairness on a Pie of Injustice

The year 2019 has so far seen some of the largest climate protests ever in response to increasingly severe and unpredictable weather patterns. While there is a strong scientific consensus that climate change is real and man-made and the public demands that governments do more to curb greenhouse gas emissions, there are still some that belief doing so would pose a disproportionate burden on their countries’ industries. One such man is the US President Donald Trump who has repeatedly made clear his intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement on the earliest occasion legally possible, November 4, 2020, one year from today and four years after the landmark agreement came into force. The Paris Agreement, currently ratified by 187 Parties, commits parties to keep a global temperature rise to within 2°C above pre-industrial levels.[1]

With uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of the Agreement due to its lack of binding enforcement mechanism, this article aims to provide an ethically fair solution to climate change. I will argue such a solution is a globally ratified international climate treaty addressing both adaptation and mitigation which distributes the costs associated with climate change based on responsibility for past emissions and the ability to pay these costs. It then allocates future emissions permits considering a State’s level of dependence on its capacity to emit. I will first explain the phenomenon of climate change and argue for the need for a global agreement that would ensure States’ compliance. I will then argue in favor of a policy of both adaptation and mitigation. Adaptation is needed due to the inevitability of climate change and maladaptation of many countries to extreme weather while mitigation measures are required because of the least developed countries’ (LDCs) lack of resources to adapt to climate change and the danger of a non-reversible climate event greatly exacerbating the effects of climate change. I will continue by arguing that the cost of climate change ought to be primarily distributed according to the “polluter pays principle” and that the intergenerational challenge posed by climate change should be addressed by allowing neither a too high discount rate to sacrifice the interests of future generations or emissions of past generations to shield the future ones from responsibility. In cases where the polluter is unable or unwilling to pay, I argue the “ability to pay principle” should be adopted. Finally, since emissions play a different role in people’s lives based on their wealth, I will argue industrialized countries should be allocated less future emission permits than LDCs.

 

Climate Change: A Real, Inevitable, Global and Man-made Problem

There is a virtually unequivocal scientific consensus on the fact that climate change is occurring and that it is a real threat to humans and other species.[2] The naturally occurring greenhouse effect causing the rise of atmospheric temperature has been exacerbated by the anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs; also ‘emissions’) in the post-industrialization era. Anthropogenic GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide released by the burning of fossil fuels, are ‘extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming’.[3] It is equally widely agreed that climate change will result in more frequent and extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, flooding or droughts.[4]Climate change is a global problem since the altered weather patterns will to some extent affect all of Earth’s inhabitants and cause indirect effects such as increased food insecurity and diseases like malaria, potentially leading to climate migration.[5] Given the inevitability of climate change and the severity and global reach of its consequences, it is imperative that this issue is addressed through international cooperation aimed at stabilizing ‘[GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.[6]

 

Achilles’ Heel of International Climate Agreements – (The Lack of) Universality and Compliance Mechanism

While the complexity of the climate change issue indicates it can be addressed on a number of levels of analysis (individual, national or global)[7], the level of States in the international arena is the most relevant in this context. Although the actions of individuals or corporations can collectively play a great role in mitigating or exacerbating climate change, restrictions on GHG emissions of individuals or corporations can only be enforced by governments.[8] Similarly, present international environmental regimes also ultimately depend on state will.[9] Therefore, climate change should be primarily tackled by the consensual agreement of the entire international community of States, producing a treaty with ambitious policy goals informed by climatological research. Wide participation of States is preferable to the narrow one, whereby emissions may ‘leak’ from participating high-cost to non-participating low-cost countries as manufacturing plants may be relocated to the latter.[10]

A wide-and-shallow agreement would for this reason also be arguably preferable to a narrow-and-deep one, in case such a trade-off was necessary due to the lack of state will.[11] Indeed, the efficiency of such a treaty would, besides factors such as environmental outcomes or cost-effectiveness, depend first and foremost on the participation and compliance of States.[12]Compliance is particularly problematic in the context of climate change where environmental interests clash with the economic ones since action on climate change incurs actual or opportunity costs. Here, Earth’s capacity to take emissions is a common pool resource –  everyone would gain the greatest short term benefits from not addressing climate change yet all would end up worse off this way in the long term – which means defection is too tempting.[13]

An international treaty on climate change would, therefore, need a compliance mechanism, one that is stronger than that of the Kyoto Protocol. The widely ratified Protocol binding industrialized countries to reduce their collective emissions by an average of 5.2 % below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-12[14] suffered from weak compliance, inter alia, because its enforcement could be circumvented by negotiating less stringent emission targets for the next period or withdrawing from the treaty.[15] The Protocol was also criticized for resulting in targets amounting to business-as-usual or even lower commitments for others[16] and exempting LDCs from binding targets altogether. Accordingly, the perceived fairness of an agreement distributing the costs of climate change is a factor crucial to compliance, and thus efficiency, since international law depends on the will and consent of States. Climate change is, therefore ‘fundamentally an ethical issue’[17] where values compete on how to allocate the burdens of addressing climate change[18] and how to compensate for the fact that industrialized countries have produced three-quarters of the world’s historical carbon emissions.[19]

 

Adaptation AND Mitigation: Better Safe Than Sorry

Any viable international climate agreement would first require a decision on a type of response to climate change. The scientific community has identified two types of responses: mitigation, or not engaging in activities that contribute to climate change and foregoing the economic benefits thereof[20], and adaptation, or coping with the ill-effects of climate change.[21] I argue in favor of a combination of both. First, it is certain that climate change is unavoidable since its prevention is no longer possible.[22] Even with the most ambitious mitigation targets in place, the current level of GHGs in the atmosphere is bound to cause extreme weather patterns that demand adaptation.[23] Policy of adaptation would often improve people’s ability to endure extreme weather events, whether as a part of normal variability of long-term weather patterns or directly resulting from anthropogenic climate change.[24] Adaptation would particularly benefit LDCs, many of which are maladapted to the possible extreme weather and prone to damage from it.[25] However, the other side of the coin is that since LDCs suffer most from today’s climate variability, they will be the ones most prone to damage due to climate change and with the least resources to adapt to it, while at the same time having contributed the least to climate change in terms of GHG emissions.[26] To compensate for this injustice, funds to transfer resources to LDCs for this purpose (e.g. Special Climate Change Fund) have been established.[27] Nevertheless, it is unlikely that they will cover the entire forecast cost of adaptation[28], which makes a case for mitigation on top of adaptation.

A mitigation policy should supplement that of adaptation as a part of an international agreement on climate change. Because of scientific uncertainty surrounding the precise extent of climate change, responding with adaptation is often favored vis-à-vis mitigation because of the significant opportunity costs associated with foregoing GHG-producing economic activity.[29] However, the uncertainty in scientific predictions about climate change may well manifest itself in the predictions being ‘overly optimistic’.[30] They may underestimate the potential for non-linear threshold effects such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (causing a yet greater rise of global sea levels) or the shut-down of the Ocean Conveyor deep circulation system (causing a significant temperature drop)[31] thus further exacerbating the impact of climate change. While current scientific models allow for the possibility of a chain of negative feedback loops mitigating the effects of climate change, other ones warn about the potential for setting off a series of positive feedback loops that would magnify the effects of climate change[32], e.g. the cycle of warmer temperature leading to lower surface reflectance and vice-versa.[33] Therefore, I argue an international response to climate change needs to adopt a ‘no-regrets’ policy[34]and include mitigation so as to prepare for the worst-case scenario of a climate surprise.

 

Sharing the Burden: The Polluter Pays Principle

Any international solution to climate change, be it through mitigation or adaptation inevitably incurs costs. Mitigation involving limits on GHG emissions is particularly challenging as it raises a question of how to distribute these burdens among countries with unequal responsibility for emissions, the ability to cover the costs of mitigation and adaptation and the extent to which they will be affected by climate change. It should be recognized that duties to mitigate climate change should fall on all[35] since we all share a common planet with a limited capacity to take emissions. Even though such responsibility should be common, it also needs to be differentiated (as, e.g., agreed in the Kyoto Protocol) in order to cater to the above-mentioned differences. The starting point for allocating responsibility should be the uncontroversial principle requiring one to clean up one’s own mess.[36] Since the mess harms also those who did not make it, it would be unfair to let those bear the costs produced by the mess.[37] By analogy, the greatest past and present GHG emitters ought to bear the costs of tackling climate change since the ‘absorptive capacity of the earth is equally allocated to all humans’.[38] Moreover, since they gained an unfair advantage from their emissions, i.e. increased wealth, they should bear an extra burden to compensate for the inequality they caused.[39] Indeed, this straightforward and uncontroversial principle has been recognized as the ‘polluter pays principle’ (PPP) by certain international organizations and treaties.[40]

One of the biggest problems of the PPP is the fact that climate change is an intergenerational phenomenon: each generation suffers the consequences of past generations’ emissions and since mitigation efforts primarily benefit future generations, each generation has an incentive to prioritize its own short-term economic benefits.[41] With regard to duties to future generations, it would be reasonable to supplement the PPP with the ‘principle of just savings’ ensuring that the social discount rate of climate change solutions should not be too high to prevent the ability of future generations to live in a just society.[42] Another problem is whether and how to hold past generations accountable for their share of emissions as those individual emitters are no longer alive. It could be argued that those people emitted GHGs in their ignorance of the effects of GHGs on climate.[43] However, the fact that emitting countries had deprived others of the sink resource that would grant them equal ability to emit and are threatening their survival by the consequences of climate change still implies responsibility. While punishing someone for the consequences of their ignorance would be unfair, holding people responsible is fair.[44]

Still, even if responsibility for climate change could be attributed to past generations, holding the present generation responsible for the actions of the past one would be unfair according to the PPP.[45] Nonetheless, the emissions of industrialized countries have continued unabated even after their effects were linked to climate change, precluding present emitters from denying responsibility or pleading ignorance.[46] It may be unfair to expect them to bear the costs of pollution they have caused plus of that they did not; yet because there is an apparent link between past emissions and today’s high living standard, today’s generation may be asked to bear the costs of climate change for having benefited from past emissions.[47] While this may be impossible according to Caney’s individualist position – industrialization did not benefit existing people because without the industrialization the same people would not be alive today[48] – countries could be held responsible as collective entities since the country as a whole benefited from industrialization.[49]

This may be unfair toward individuals who did not contribute to GHG emissions or protested against decisions leading to them[50], yet someone must bear the costs of past emissions and a completely fair option might not be available. Indeed, those emissions are now ‘part of the fabric of the world’ making it extremely hard to hold someone accountable and determining a fair extent of compensation they owe[51]; letting those related to past polluters to bear the costs seems like the fairest option.

 

read more Addressing Climate Justice for Women in Global South

 

Sharing the Burden: The Ability to Pay Principle

While the PPP should be the primary principle for assigning duties to bear costs of climate change, secondary duty-bearers need to be identified to avoid the costs of climate change being left unpaid in cases when the primary duty-bearers (polluters) are unable or unwilling to bear these costs.[52] The PPP could, in this case, be supplemented by the ‘ability to pay principle’ (APP).[53]According to this principle, all States should bear the costs of climate change irrespective of their contributions to the problem since all will be affected by it.[54] Under APP, burdens of climate change are distributed equitably according to a progressive rate of payment, requiring States to pay an amount that is in accordance with their means.[55] This principle is appealing because, factually, most countries that have emitted and continue to emit the bulk of GHGs, i.e. industrialized countries, are also those that are the most capable of bearing the costs of climate change. In theory, however, it seems unfair to ask wealthy States that have not been emitting GHGs to ‘compensate for the shortcomings of others’[56], especially in cases when the polluter is unwilling to pay. Nevertheless, it is still a better alternative than letting those least well-off to suffer from the consequences of climate change.[57]

 

Blankets versus Jewelry

Having argued in favor of the polluter pays principle and the ability to pay principle in assigning duties to bear costs of climate change, an international treaty governing a climate change response needs to allocate future emission permits to prevent future emissions from further damaging the climate.[58] Since the scientifically established annual global ceiling on GHG emissions amounts to less than the current level of emissions, future emissions would need to be subjected to (potentially tradeable) emissions permits. Jamieson proposes a number of ways to allocate such permits; the first solution, to distribute them on the basis of existing emissions, would not make much sense as the planet is a common resource.[59] Similarly, a distribution based on economic efficiency would also be unacceptable as it is hard to prove one country’s economic activity benefits the whole world as well as because emissions will be allocated towards efficient uses by markets so there is no reason for efficient users to get extra permits for free.[60]

Distributing permits on a per capita basis seems prima facie the fairest solution and indexing population figures to a certain year would avoid incentivizing (potential) pro-natality policies.[61] While this option produces equality, it is inequitable since emissions play a different role in people’s lives.[62] Indeed, while a great portion of industrialized countries’ emissions come from the production of luxurious goods, the survival of many LDCs may depend on their GHG-emitting economic activity. Therefore, the fairest way to allocate permits would be to ask States to make an equitable sacrifice in the sense that ‘poor persons should not be told to sell their blankets in order that rich persons may keep their jewelry’.[63] Indeed, it seems unreasonable to expect LDCs to sacrifice their own vital interests to help industrialized countries to solve a problem the latter has caused and benefited from, especially when the latter does not seem obliged to help the former with their problems.[64]

While it may be hard to determine States’ right to emissions to ensure that the extent of their sacrifice matches, a good starting point is the principle of a guaranteed minimum. Accordingly, all people should be allowed to live a decent human life, especially when the total of resources available is great enough to guarantee everyone at least enough, while some will still have considerably more than others.[65] Thus, LDCs should have the right to higher GHG emissions[66], until they at least reach the minimum[67], while the industrialized countries should be allocated fewer permits and bear the costs of climate change[68], reflecting the above-discussed PPP and APP.

 

read more Effects of Climate Change in Bangladesh is NOW!

 

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have argued that an international response to the global phenomenon of climate change is needed in the form of a treaty that would contain adaptation policy as well as targets to reduce the global volume of GHG emissions. It should be governed by the polluter pays principle supplemented by the ability to pay principal and demand States to make sacrifice proportionate to their level of economic development in allocating emission permits. In practice, both the PPP and APP put the burden of dealing with the costs of climate change on industrialized countries and the fact that emissions are vital to LDCs’ survival lessens the latter’s obligations regarding this matter.

 

 

writer

Lucia Jamrichova
Leiden University, Netherland

 

Bibliography

Aldy, J., Barrett, S. and Stavins, R., “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures.” Climate Policy, 2003, 373-397

Caney, S., “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775

Gardiner, S., “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600

Harris, P. G., World ethics and climate change: From international to global justice. 2010. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers” https://www.ipclimate change.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [11 April 2017]

Jamieson, D.,  “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 217-248

Jamieson, D., “Environment,” in Catriona McKinnon (ed.) Issues in Political Theory. 2014. OUP 3rd edition 236-257

Shue, H., “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999) 531‒545

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The Paris Agreement http://unfclimate changec.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php [13 April 2017]

 

United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on 20 January 1994, A/RES/48/189

UNFclimate changeC, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at COP3 in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997

[1]                      United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The Paris Agreement http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php

[2]                      See e.g. Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 pp. 566-8

[3]                      Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers” https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf p. 4 emphasis in original

[4]                      See e.g. Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 p. 768

[5]                      See e.g. Dale Jamieson, “Environment,” in Catriona McKinnon (ed.) Issues in Political Theory. 2014. OUP 3rd edition 236-257 p. 243

[6]                      UN General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on 20 January 1994, A/RES/48/189 Article 2

[7]                      Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 p. 755

[8]                      ibid

[9]                      ibid

[10]                    Joseph Aldy, Scott Barrett, and Robert Stavins “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures.” Climate Policy, 2003, 373-397 p. 375

[11]                    ibid

[12]                    ibid

[13]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 582

[14]                    UNFCC (1997) Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at COP3 in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997

[15]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 593; Joseph Aldy, Scott Barrett, and Robert Stavins “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures.” Climate Policy, 2003, pp. 373-397 p. 381

[16]                    Joseph Aldy, Scott Barrett, and Robert Stavins “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures.” Climate Policy, 2003, 373-397 p. 380

[17]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 556

[18]                    ibid at pp. 578-9

[19]                    Paul G. Harris, World ethics and climate change: From international to global justice. 2010. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press pp. 38-9

[20]                    Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 p. 751

[21]                    ibid at p. 752

[22]                    See e.g. Joseph Aldy, Scott Barrett, and Robert Stavins “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures.” Climate Policy, 2003, 373-397 p. 377

[23]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 573

[24]                    Dale Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited,  217-248 p. 221

[25]                    ibid

[26]                    Dale Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited,  217-248 p. 225

[27]                    ibid at p. 226

[28]                    ibid at p. 227

[29]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 570

[30]                    ibid at p. 562

[31]                    ibid

[32]                    ibid at p. 568

[33]                    Dale Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited,  217-248 p. 223

[34]                    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change cited in Dale Jamieson, “Adaptation, mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 217-248 p. 222

[35]                    Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 p. 773

[36]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 579; Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999) 531‒545 p. 533

[37]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 p. 533

[38]                    Neumayer cited in Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 p. 754

[39]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 pp. 533-4

[40]                    See e.g. OECD, The Polluter-Pays Principle: OECD Analyses and Recommendations. Paris: OECD, 1992.

[41]                    Dale Jamieson, “Environment,” in Catriona McKinnon (ed.) Issues in Political Theory. 2014. OUP 3rd edition pp. 236-257 pp. 243-4

[42]                    Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 p. 750

[43]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 581; Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999) 531‒545 p. 535; Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law 2005 p. 761

[44]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 p.535

[45]                    ibid at p. 536

[46]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 p. 536; Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law 2005 p. 761

[47]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 p. 536

[48]                    Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 pp.757-8

[49]                    ibid

[50]                    ibid at p. 760

[51]                    Dale Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 217-248 p. 232

[52]                    Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 pp. 763-6

[53]                    ibid at p. 767

[54]                    ibid

[55]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 pp. 537-8

[56]                    Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change” in Leiden Journal of International Law,18 (2005), 747–775 p. 772

[57]                    ibid

[58]                    See text to note 6

[59]                    Dale Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 217-248 pp. 230-1

[60]                    ibid

[61]                    Dale Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Richard B. Howarth (ed.) Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 5, 2005) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 217-248 p. 231; Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 584

[62]                    Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 584

[63]                    Paul G. Harris, World ethics and climate change: From international to global justice. 2010. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press p. 133

[64]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 p. 543

[65]                    ibid at pp. 540-1

[66]                    Paul G. Harris, World ethics and climate change: From international to global justice. 2010. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press p. 133; Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), 555-600 p. 579

[67]                    Henry Shue, “Global Environment And International Inequality” International Affairs 75, 3 (1999)  531‒545 p. 542

[68]                    ibid at p. 545

admin

admin@internationalaffairsbd.com

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *